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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF OF APPELUEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant defends the trial court's ruling in favor of Defendant by dismissing the charge
of driving under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, based on two (2) prior convictions
of the same charges, and based on records from two (2) justice courts, both which are "courts of
no record"., and enhanced to a third degree felony by the use of the two prior convictions in the
"courts of no record".
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The trial court couched the issue of compliance with Rule 9-301(2)(B) and the lack of said
compliance.
Defendant argues that issue presented to the trial court is whether the records from the
justice court can be the basis of a third degree felony when, in fact the records are from the
justice courts, which are by definition "courts of no record"
CONSTITUTION PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
Defendant relies on the "due process" clause of the United States Constitution and the
"due process" clause of the Constitution of Utah, and that the use of such "records" are
violations of the "due process" clause when "records" comefroma "court of no record",
Defendant is charged under Utah Code Ann 41-6-44 with a third degree felony based on
two (2) prior convictions of driving under the influence of alcohol in two (2) justice courts.
-1-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol, enhanced to a third
degree felony ;pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 (2003) and based on two (2) prior
convictions within ten (10) years of this conviction
One of Defendant's friends interpreted for him at the in his initial appearance, but
retained counsel shortly thereafter.
The State's witness, the officer, testified that the blood alcohol was .17.
The State submitted records that Defendant had been convicted twice before, within ten
(10) years
Defendant moved to dismiss the enhanced charges based on the fact that the prior
convictions were decided injustice courts, which are by definition "courts of no record".,.
The language of the Statute does not permit the use of prior convictions to be applied
retroactive, and that the : "courts of no recorcTare indeed are "courts of no record."
The trial court dismissed the arguments and and instead sua sponnte held raised the issue
that Rule 9-301 had not been complied with, and on those grounds found in favor of Defendant.
Defendant was surprised with the ruling by the trial court and his reliance on Rule 9-30L
and did not anticipate said ruling.
The trial court issued a ruling dismissing the enhanced charge, without prejudice, and
permitting the prosecution to "file a lesser offense..." The Drosecution declined and this anneal
wasfiledby the State.
ARGUMENT
THE STATITTF

The Legislature amended the DUI statute effective July 1, 2001, and reads as follows:
UQA 41-6-44 (6)(a)
A conviction for a violation of Subsection is a third degree felony
if it is committed
(i) within 10 years of two or more previous convictions under this section,
(ii) at any time after a conviction of
(A) Automobile homicide,
(B) a felony under this section committed after July 1,2001.
-2-

The State argued in the trial court that" There is nothing ambiguous about the statute."
Defendant argues that, to the contrary, that the statute is not crystal clear. The inclusion
of the automobile homicide clause does nothing more than muddy the waters. For some reason,
the legislature found it necessary to do so, and the question arises as to why the statute is so
constructed. Surely the legislature would not deliberately pass an ambiguous statute, or would
they, and if so, for what purpose.
The DUI statute appears to have been crafted so as to be ambiguous. The structure of
the statute is odd, at best, and nefarious at best.
For what reasons are the DUI statute and the automobile homicide statute combined in
this DUI statute? And why is the configerationof the statute somewhat odd.? Is the reason to
allow the courts to interpret the law in favor of the State?
A look back at the previous DUI statute in 1996 is telling. The 1996 DUI Code follows:
Utah Code Ann. 41-6-44 (1996)
(6)(a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation under committed within six
prior years or two or more prior convictions is a (1) class A misdemeanor, except
as provided in this Subsection and
(ii) a thud degree felony if at least
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23,1990, or
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after July 1,1996
The comparison between the 1996 DUI statute and the 2001 DUI statutes is
remarkable. The 1996 DUI statute is clear, straight forward, easily understood, and has and
effective dates of April, 1990 and 1996.
The 2001 DUI statute is ambiguous, and construction of the 2001 DUI statute leaves
open the door open for retroactive application for 10 years..
In fact, the 2001 Statute is, in fact is being applied retroactively, in spite of the plain
meaning of Utah Code Ann. Sec. 68-3-3. which reads as follows:
"No part of these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so declared."
In practice, the State and the Justice Courts are applying the 2001 DUI statute ten (10)
years back from the present offense, and have been doing so since the 2001 DUI became
effective.
-3-

DUE PROCESS AND THE DUI STATUTE
The basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning of the conduce that
makes it a crime has been recognized by the Supreme Court.
The case of United States v. Harris. 347 U.S. 612. set forth the "defmitiveness"
standard as follows:
The constitutional requirement of definitiveness is violated by
a criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence
fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.
The underlying principle is that no man shall be held criminally
responsible for conduct which he could not reasonably understand
to be proscribed, id at 617
We have recognized in cases that "a statute that either forbids or
requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates thefirstessential of due process of law.
A comparison of the 1996 DUI statute and the 2001 statute reveals the attempt by the
legislature to "muddy the water", i.e. to leave open the door to various and sundry interpret ions
of the DUI statute, including the resurrection of old DUI convictions for the purpose of using
prior convictions for DUI and enhancing the charge to a third degree felony,
The 2001 DUI statute certainly leaves open the very essence of a statute which can be
and has been interpreted to fulfill the results the legislature was attempting to achieve.
However, in order to enhance the charges in DUI cases, the legislature must rely on
vagueness of the statute to accomplish the objective of .enhancing the charge to a third degree
felony.
A comparison of the DUI statute which came into play in 1996 and the present DUI
statute shows the amazing differences between the two (2) statutes. A further look at every
DUI statute back to 1990 shows that the 2001 statute is an aberration, and not in keeping with
the straight forward language of the DUI statutes in Utah
A perusal of previous statutes does not include an enhancement of a previous conviction,
or convictions to a higher charge. There appears to be no such enhancement precedent in Utah.
-4-

PROCEDURES AND PROCEDURAL LAW
COURT OF NO RECORD
Procedure is the mode of proceeding by which a legal right is enforced, as distinguished
from the law which gives or defines therightand which by means of the proceeding, the court is
to administer;: the machinery ,as distinguishedfromthe product. BlacFs Law Dictionary. 4th
JEditipn, 11957r
The Utah Legislature, in all of it's collective wisdom, or lack thereof, "repealed" the
Circuit Court in 1996.
In doing so, the legislature violated long held procedures which define the rights of a
defendant, and by which the means of the proceeding the court is to administer.,
At the same time, the legislature abandoned the "justice of the peace" a "court of no
record ", and created the "Justice Court", also a "court of no record"
The legislature then imposed duties on the "Justice Court" , including trials for driving
under the influence of alcohol, and related offenses, which would previously adjudicated by the
Circuit Court "on the record".
The scenario continues, and the legislature added provisions so that a prior DUI can be
"enhanced" to require that a second DUI now has a longer jail term of 10 days in jail, and fines
and fees totaling as much as $1800 plus.
It is in this posture that the legislature then came up with the notion that a third DUI can
be charged and convicted for a third DUI, and the result would become a conviction for a third
degree felony, with a sentence of from zero to five (5) years in prison.
The present full text of UCA 41-4-44. the DUI statute is attached at Addendum (1)
The 1986 DUI statute is instructive.
UCA 77-35-7 (c) reads as follows:
(c) if a defendant is charged with a felony, he shall not be called on to plead before
the magistrate. During the initial appearance before the magistrate, the defendant shall be advised
of his right to a preliminary examination. If the defendant waives his right to a preliminary
examination, and the prosecutor consents, the magistrate shall forthwith order the defendant
bound over to the district court.
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THE MISSING MAGISTRATE

In the quest to overhaul the justice system in Utah, the legislature "repealed" the Circuit
Court and distributed the functions to the justice of the peace, now known as the Justice Court.
The Justice Court, however, remains a "court of no record".
A first offense for DUI carries a penalty of two (2) days in jail and fine of $1200 plus.
The legislature also provided that the Justice Court records can be used to "enhance" a
second DUI conviction with jail time of (10) days in jail.and fines and fees of $1800 plus.
The charge of a third DUI degree felony bears a sentence of from zero (0) to five (5)
years in prison.
The repeal of the Circuit Court is the repeal of the magistrate, and the attempt to assign
the duties of the magistrate to the Justice Court, formerly known as the justice of the peace, and
with the same status as a "court of no record".
In spite of the designation of the justice of the peace now being re-named the "justice
court," the Justice Court is still retained as a "court of no record.".
And the "records" of the justice court are now used as a basis to enhance the penalties in
the justice court, and ultimately turned into a third degree felony.
A comparison of the functions of the now repealed Circuit Court, aka the magistrate, is
instructive.
TJCA 78-4-2 (1990) reads as follows:
The purpose of this act is to create a statewide court of record of limited jurisdiction
to provide full time professional judicial service to every county in the state on a regular
basis organized and administrated in like manner to the district courts of the state. To
this end, this act shall liberally applied,
UCA 78-4-4 (1990^ Pursuant to the provisions of Article VIII Sec 1 of the Constitution
of Utah circuit courts are established to serve the people of Utah with the State being
divided into circuits as provided in this ehapter
For well over 100 years, Utah citizens have been served by the full time professional
judicial service to every county in the state on a regular basis, including the time when the
Circuit Court, literally rode from one court to another.
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The Supreme Court of the United State has on numerous occasions expressed the need for
a magistrate, particularly in the context of search warrants.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S 347 held:
Noting that the Fourth Amendment protects people and not places. We concluded
that every electronic ease dropping upon private conversations is a search or seizure
it can comply with constitutional standards only when authorized by a neutral
magistrate upon a strop of probable cause and under precise limitations and
appropriate safeguards.
Upon a search of the issue, Defendant has not been able to locate any reference which
would allow a justice of the peace to act as a magistrate.
STREAMLINE JUSTICE
Several months prior to July 1,1996, District Court Judge Lyle Anderson convened a
meeting of the Southeastern Utah Association. The purpose of the meeting was to explain to the
members the changes in in the laws made by the previous legislature..
Judge Lyle Anderson advised that the legislature had repealed the Circuit Court, and the
changes would "streamline" the judicial process by eliminating the Circuit Court, aka the
magistrate.
The new idea was to give original jurdistdiction in all matters civil and criminal, to the
District Court, not excepted by the Utah Constitution. The District Court was to take
jurisdiction over all mattersfiledin the Circuit Court ijJed prior to July 1, J 996.
The "justice of the peace" title was abandoned, and" justice court" was born. The
"justice judge" was invented. The new "justice court" conducts"trials"but "not on the record." .
At the same time, the "records" from the previous DUI convictions in the justice court
are the basis for a third degree felony charge, if the prior convictions occurred retroactively
within the last ten (10) years.
Prior to 1996, the Circuit Court presided over preliminary hearings, and held
misdemeanor trials on the record. With the demise of the magistrate, misdemeanors are the
purview of the justice court
-7
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accountability or oversight for the what kind of justice happens in the "court of no record",
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the Justice Court, and includes, being a citizen of the United States, 25 years of age, a resident of

voter of the county of residence..
1 1"I \A, 7;R S II' 14 nrni/irlp*;:, tli^t flip i net i r e rnijrt havp iurisHipfinri nvpr rrlnQQ R anrl C*.

misdemeanors, violations of ordinances, and infractions within their territorial jurisdiction, except
those offenses o\ ei w hich the ji ivei tile con u t has exclusn e ji irisdiction.
UCA 78-5-12 i rcquue^

HUH

d HIKKCI in- kept.

UCA 7o-5-j 22* <'•'';••; v • *hv !n>!iL L -,'uui: to iiave a docket index, to be Kept in aipnauetical
order, and include tne names o±. tiie parties to eacn judgment.
UCA 78-5-122 orovides that entries in a Justice court judge's docket under Sec. 78-5-121,
certified by the judge or his successor in office are prima facie evidence of the facts stated.
Records from the justice court are reported to the Bureau of Criminal Identification and to
NCIC, the national register. Records are available to employers, insurance companies, and others
who may have need to know a particular person's criminal history.
The"recii-.' -^ n^-d UK-H io enhance the penalties on a subsequent conv iction,
The use of the words "Court of no record" in the Utah Constitution and in specific
statutes, as

IIOKU

a ^ n t . is HOI a simpie 'misnomer".
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The State cannot have it both ways. If the State does indeed believe it is in the interest of
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does argue that if the State is going to have a Court of no Record, then the justice court records
must be prohibited for \ ise for any and all other" purposes, including enhancements to a greater
crime, and notifying BCI, NCiC, employers, insurance companies, ui others. Anything less is
deceiving, and a a mockery of of the Rule of Law.
THE LAI J I) DGE
To be chosen as a justice court, a person must be a citizen of the United States,
25 years of age, a resick n; *.". i (<•: :*•<

least three years, a resident of the county, and a

qualified voter. UCA 75-5-136
justice court judges are appointed by the appointing authority anu coiiinmed by a
majority vote of the local legislative body. UCA 75-5-134(2)
A justice court judge employed by one entity may not receive a total salary greater than
85% of the salary of a district iud-e UCA 78-5-128(1 Va)
A justice court iudiie cmnloved in fMi.ir ihati one entitv as a Justice court iud^e mav not
receive a total salary greater than the salary of a district court judge. UCA 75-5-128(1 Va).
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In 1972 the Supreme Court decided Ward v. Village of Monroeville. 409 U.S. 510 (1927).
the judge in the justice court was also the mayor and the village received a substantial portion of
its income from fines imposed by him as a judge. The issue was the possible bias of the judge
ai id that fear may materialized fn this case.
In a similar case, Tumev v. Ohio. 273 U.S. 510. the issue was not the training or
education of the judge, but at uu j-

le to interest in the outco

a^

The Tumey Court field that the financial interest in the fines was thought to \i^ <\
possible bias in finding guilt and fixing amounts of fines by t; ^ j uU^

»; ^. fummcy Court found

that the potential for bias was not impermissable.
r

l 'he fact that a lay judge w f to has no more than A !u^;. .Ui<.»- npioma iv being paid the

same salary as a district court. judge certainly leaves the distinct impression that the decisions of
the justice court are suscepumc \o mas leaning m l.noi

:.

. mpio^u,» ,: mc iocdi w u'es,

towns,and municipal entities. Whose side is the Justice Court Judge on? The answer is unclear

or disc or taken by a court stenographer. No verbatim,, transcript is not available to determine

what a defendant was told or not told and could have understood.
There ur no "oversight" of the |u«;tuv court Thi justice comt can commit crroi aftei
error over and over again, without even knowing it because there is no record.
r

.'.

• •

J

by who. In some justice courts in this jurisdiction, the judge prohibits taping the proceedings.
1 A
-It—

The same errors can continue to occur ad infinitum because there is no way to "prove"'

procedures,

cards"

1 he foundation of this "house ot cards" rests on proceedings that began in both instances

bUCIi iiici^OiluUC tiitit vvv/Uiu ttiivi n i v \JUIK/\JIII\S
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To suggest that (lie Jeinedv is lu-'<iv v .

lij.u.i- >-;

• .-, .-•, j;.iv.U!:icni pu^>niu -.- o

nlocn h !•- of tr< rights is not a substitute to having the cou:' condu*: an appropriate Rule 1 1
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The difference between a high school graduate and a jtid^e who has earned a Juris
**•• • ' i degree *s moi e than night and daj

* . . '*.

-

•* i^,;- - - \e.ir\ *>f undorrrndi..,*

es. three (3) years of iaw school, and successmi. passage the three (3) day bar examination.
An ippiK-1-"!' i<»--" -t'sM-iM J-ih-.i i.^ 11Pun:::-if.; i(itiii)ugii uacKgrouiiu screening
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
The United States Supreme r o n r i

m

1888 in wrote Callan \ Wilson. 127 U.S. 540

Except in that class or grade of offenses called petty offenses, winch according to
^"imon
m o n iaw.
law, may be procc
proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally
/>/%•« c+t+n+oH TAr +no+ nnrfHACo
v u n j i i i u i v u l v l cimi jJui p v o v .
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The United States Supreme Court described the justice court system in the case Colton v.
Kentucky. 407 U S 104 in the following manner
the interior are not designated or equipped to conduct error-free trials, or
insure or full recognition of constitutional freedoms. They are courts of
convenience, to provide speedy and inexpensive means of disposition
of charges of minor offenses"

In the case ofNurth v. Ru^ell. 427 U.S. (1977) the Supreme Court addressed the
justifications of the state for continuing justice court tribunals, including "increasing burdens on
state judiciaries", and the "interest of both the defendant and the State to provide speedier and
less costly adjudications" than those provided in courts where the full range of constitutional
guarantees is available.
The State could designate driving under the influence charges as Class A misdemeanors,
and trials could be heard on the record before a qualified, law-trained judge. In that setting, there
would be no question about the prior proceedings, and the penalties could be enhanced on a
second or third conviction.
The Russell Court addressed the State's policy of "convenience" to those charged to be
tried in their own community, rather than having to travel to a distant court where a law-trained
judge is provided, and to have a trial after business hours. The Court noted these practical
considerations.
The questions regarding the "convenience" of having a trial in their "own community"
and not having to go to a distant court have been answered, at least in this State.
-16-

The 1996 transition from a justice of the peace" to a "justice court judge" and the fact
that the justice court is now7 a trial court has refigured the legal landscape.
The result is that almost every small town, municipality, or city now has its own justice
court, together with jury trials, its own judge, its own staff, and its own police department.
The cities and towns have found a lucrative money making machine. Emery County has
only two (2) justice courts, but other counties have numerous justice courts. Carbon County has
five (5) justice courts, and Sanpete County has nine (9)
Another consequence of the "morfmg" of the justice of the peace into a trial court is the
hiring of substantially more police officers. For instance, Helper City in Carbon County, a town
of 2000 people, in 1963, had one chief of police and one part time deputy. Helper City now has
eight (8) police officers. The trend in other similar small towns it the same.

SHQVLD A DM A BE PETTY QFFENgE?
The premise of justice court is the lay judge, the Court of No Record and the "petty
offense".
Defendant submits that based on the fact that this Statute is on the books and now before
this Court is the best evidence that the charge against Defendant of Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol is no longer a petty offense. Perhaps the Legislature should take another look about
DUTs and so re-classify the DUI as a Class A misdemeanor that can be enhanced to a felony.
Defendant does not argue that the justice court per se should be abolished.
Defendant does argue that to base a third degree felony charge on the "records'5 from the
"Court of no Record " is simply not true, by definition.
-17-

There is no "record" m the justice court. The piles of paper the justice court is ordered to
keep and/or present to a defendant does not overcome the basic fact that there are no reliable
records from which the whole truth can be known There is no system in place to listen to the
actual proceedings. There is also the lack of accountability in at the actual proceedings.
The proceedings in the justice courts are not based on the Laws of Evidence or the Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
The rulings of a justice court judge are not made based on the Rule of Law, but on the best
judgment of a person "who has demonstrated maturity of judgment, integrity, and the ability to
understand and apply appropriate law with impartiality". UCA 75-5-137(4)
UCA 41-6-44 , the Driving under the Influence of Alcohol,
WHEREFORE, Defendant moves this Court for an Order reducing the charge in this case
from a third degree felonv to a Class B Misdemeanor DIJT charge and remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings.

DATED THIS

W

y^j^

MARGRET SIDWELL TA
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
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41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with
specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol —
Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties - Suspension or revocation of
license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and
(10);
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is taken illegally in the
body;
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related
reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(vi) a violation described in Subsections (l)(a)(i) through (v), which judgment of conviction is
reduced under Section 76-3-402; or
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any district, possession,
or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol, any drug,
or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments
administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815;
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse program that is
approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section
62A-15-105;
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and dependency screening and
assessment obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse
and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105;
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or creates
a substantial risk of death;
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program that is
approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section
62A-15-105;
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse program;
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care
that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the
person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the test;
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to
a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of
operation or actual physical control.

(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use
alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of
breath.
(3) (a) A person convicted thefirstor second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(i) class B misdemeanor; or
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the vehicle
in a negligent manner;
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time of the offense; or
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at the
time of the offense.
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if the
person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated the
vehicle in a negligent manner.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon afirstconviction, impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with
Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the
court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order substance
abuse treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d); and
(iii) impose afineof not less than $700.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance abuse
treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate.
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order probation for the person in
accordance with Subsection (14).
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of. 16 or higher, the
court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a prior conviction under this
section, the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240
consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to:
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 hours; or
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with
Subsection (13).
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home confinement, the
court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment;
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order substance

abuse treatment as described under Subsection (5)(d); and
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance abuse
treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate,
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14).
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is:
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two or more prior
convictions; or
(ii) at any time after a conviction of:
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 2001.
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of conviction is reduced under
Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this section.
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a prison sentence and
places the defendant on probation the court shall impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours.
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring the person to obtain a
screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse treatment program
providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised follow-through after
treatment for not less than 240 hours.
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the court orders probation, the
probation shall be supervised probation which may include requiring the person to participate in home
confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Subsection (13).
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be suspended and
the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed under this
section has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to order a
convicted person to: participate in a screening and assessment; and an educational series; obtain, in the
discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, substance abuse treatment; or
do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-44,6 or 41-6-45
under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and assessment, an educational series,
or substance abuse treatment in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under
Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court would render in connection with
applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5),
and (6).
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to:
(i) complete all court ordered:
(A) screening and assessment;
(B) educational series;
(C) substance abuse treatment; and
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs. Upon receiving the
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notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance with Subsections
53-3-221(2) and (3).
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a violation of
Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in
satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution
shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the
violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there was consumption of
alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this Subsection
(9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of Section 41-6-44.6 or
41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9).
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section when the
officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his presence, and if the
officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for the first time under
Subsection (2);
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense under
Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection (1) if the violation is
committed within a period often years from the date of the prior violation; and
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection (12).
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number
of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the
previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court may order the operator's
license of a person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to be suspended or revoked for an
additional period of 90 days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the highways those
persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12)(b), the court
shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or revoke that person's
driving privileges for a specified period of time.
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert the appropriate corrections, probation
monitoring agency, law enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's whereabouts.
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require:
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the person, so that the person's
compliance with the court's order may be monitored; and
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring.
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place an
electronic monitoring device on the person and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence
of the person or other specified location.
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(d) The court may:
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance abuse testing
instrument,
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the time the person is subject to
home confinement;
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend school educational
classes, or employment and to travel directly between those activities and the person's home; and
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the person is determined to
be indigent by the court.
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be administered directly by the
appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by contract with a private provider.
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by the court under
Subsection (13)(c)(iv).
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or (5)(e):
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation,
(ii) the person shall pay all of the costs of the probation, and
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation.
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by contract with a probation
monitoring agency or a private probation provider.
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor the person's compliance
with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and court orders received under
this article and shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or complete that sentence or those
conditions or orders.
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with probation if the person is
determined to be indigent by the court.
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of waivers by the
court under Subsection (14)(d)(0(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is admissible evidence that
the person had a blood alcohol level of. 16 or higher, then if the court does not order:
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then the court shall enter the
reasons on the record; and
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the record:
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation for the person in
accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in accordance with
Subsection (13).
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